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ABSTRACT 
Controller Area Network is a bus commonly used by controllers inside vehicles and in various industrial control 
applications. In the past controllers were assumed to operate in secure perimeters, but today these environments 
are well connected to the outside world and recent incidents showed them extremely vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
To withstand such threats, one can implement security in the application layer of CAN. Here we design, reﬁne 
and implement a broadcast authentication protocol based on the well known paradigm of using key-chains and 
time  synchronization,  a  commonly  used  Mechanism  in  wireless  sensor  networks,  which  allows  us  to  take 
advantage from the use of symmetric primitives without the need of secret shared keys during broadcast. But, as 
process  control  is  a  time  critical  operation  we  make  several  reﬁnements  in  order  to  improve  on  the 
authentication delay. For this we study several trade-offs to alleviate shortcomings on computational speed, 
memory and bandwidth up to the point of using reduced versions of hash functions that can assure ad hoc 
security. To prove the efficiency of the protocol  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Modern automotive electronics systems are 
dis-tributed  as  they  are  implemented  with  software 
run-ning  over  networked  Electronic  Control  Units 
(ECU) communicating via serial buses and gateways. 
Most  systems  (but  not  all;  indeed,  the  automotive 
indus-try  has  started  to  take  actions  to  prevent 
tampering  with  calibration  parameters  in  engine 
control  applica-tions)  have  not  been  designed  with 
security in mind. In addition, in the majority of the 
cases,  there  was  little  or  no  interest  for  hackers  to 
compromise them. The only exception known so far 
is  the  after-market  community  that  tampers  with 
engine calibrations to increase engine’s performance. 
Methods  and  tools  for  the  verification  of  the 
reliability of automotive electronics systems against 
random  failures  are  commercially  available. 
However, no security aspect is included as part of the 
hardware  and  software  architecture  development 
process and no standard communication protocol has 
any built-in provisions to prevent or mitigate attacks. 
Communication networks are vulnerable as they en-
able unauthorized access in a relatively straight for-
ward manner as all the communications between the 
ECUs in the vehicle are performed with no authen-
tication [2]. Authentication mechanisms ensure that 
sender  and  receiver  identities  are  not  compromised 
and thus, the sender and the receiver are who they are 
claiming  to  be.  Unfortunately,  current  communi-
cation network protocols, including Controller Area 
Network (CAN), FlexRay, MOST, and LIN have no 
authentication (or at best have CRC mechanisms to  
the potential exists for an automotive ECU to be infil-
trated by an attacker, who can then potentially gain 
access, via a serial communication bus, to an array of 
other ECUs. guarantee data integrity) and send their 
messages  in  the  clear.  Hence,  room  for  fraudulent 
communi-cations between ECUs exists. For example, 
in the CAN protocol, masquerade attacks followed by 
re-play attacks  
ECU  pretending  to  be  another  ECU  by 
sending/replaying a message the ECU is not en-titled 
to send) are likely to happen as messages ex-changed 
in a CAN network are broadcast from one ECU to the 
rest of the ECUs in the network. In fact, the receiver 
cannot  verify  the  identity  of  the  sender  of  the 
message as an attacker could have pretended to be 
someone else (and therefore sending a message with 
an ID the pretender was not configured to send in the 
first  place).  Again,  this  scenario  is  called  a 
masquerade-based attack which then leads to a pos-
sible ―replay‖ attack as the attacker, by pretending to 
The state of the art processes, methods, and 
tools  We  are  convinced  that  security  can  be  taken 
into ac-count in the early phases of the development 
cycle  of  automotive  electronics  systems,  both  by 
enforcing  software  programming  standards  that 
prevent  soft-ware  defects  that  may  enable  cyber-
attacks,  as  well  as  by  implementing  security 
mechanisms such as au-thentication that enable the 
validation  of  the  identity  of  the  sender  to  avoid 
potentially  harmful  messages  to  be 
replayed/transmitted  across  the  communica-tion 
network. However, even for known vulnerabil-ities, 
one has to perform a cost versus benefits anal-ysis as 
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the  communication  data  rates  available  are  very 
limited—it  is  necessary  to  evaluate  whether  a  full 
authentication-based solution that addresses se-curity 
concerns  is  compatible  with  performance  and 
resource cost constraints that are typical of automo-
tive embedded systems and  specifically of the pre-
dominant communication protocols used in the vehi-
cle (e.g., CAN has very limited data rates between 
33kbps and 500kbps). In fact, authentication mech-
anisms typically require large amounts of processing 
power, memory, and bandwidth, in addition to those 
already reserved for the messages that are exchanged 
across ECUs. As more bytes need to be transmitted, 
current bus technologies may not be suﬃcient given 
their already limited available bandwidth. 
Authentication  mechanisms  have  been 
proposed in the literature. The TESLA protocol [3–5] 
uses  a  time-delayed  release  of  keys  for 
authentication.  A  receiver  can  check  the  Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) after receiving the key 
used to compute the MAC. To guarantee security, the 
protocol needs to maintain global time and make sure 
that  a  receiver  gets  a  message  before  the 
corresponding key is re-leased. In [6–8], the authors 
emphasize the con-straints in an embedded network 
and  consider  a  time-triggered  (i.e.,  global  time  is 
available) broadcast pro-tocol. Even with the features 
proposed for reduc-ing the number of bits transmitted 
and  for  achieving  fault  tolerance,  two  major 
challenges exist in apply-ing these approaches to the 
CAN protocol. First, the bandwidth available in the 
CAN protocol is very lim-ited. Second, there is no 
notion of global time in the protocol. The challenge 
for OEMs in the automotive industry is to design a 
security  mechanism  for  CAN  with  high  security, 
combined  with  minimal  communi-cation  overhead, 
high  fault  tolerance,  low  cost,  and  no  global 
synchronization clock. 
In  this  paper,  we  describe  a  security 
mechanism  that  addresses  the  requirements  stated 
earlier. Specifi-cally, our mechanism can be used to 
retro-fit the CAN protocol to protect it from cyber-
attacks such as masquerade and replay attack with as 
low  as  pos-sible  overhead,  and  high  degree  of 
tolerance to faults. 
We  address  the  low  cost  requirement  by 
providing a software-only solution with no additional 
hardware required. We focus on the CAN protocol 
because  it  is  the  most  used  serial  data  protocol  in 
current in-vehicle networked architectures, and it will 
likely be used for a long time. We define the attack 
scenarios  that  our  security  mechanism  addresses, 
namely  mas-querade  and  replay.  We  focus  on  a 
security  mecha-nism  based  upon  message 
authentication  and  sym-metric  secret  keys.  Our 
mechanism  leverages  and  modifies  the  work 
described  in  [6–8]  as  we  introduce  the  concept  of 
counters to implement time-stamping of the message 
signatures (MACs) in order to over-come the lack of 
global time in the CAN protocol. We do not focus on 
the  initial  security  critical  key  assign-ment  and 
distribution as this aspect, although very important, is 
already being mentioned in [6]. Instead, we focus on 
run-time  authentication  both  in  the  sys-tem  steady 
state  (after  ignition  key-on  and  the  secu-rity  secret 
keys have been distributed to the ECUs) and during 
running resets experienced by some of the ECUs in 
the  system  (when  counters  are  potentially  out  of 
synchronization).  Regarding  resets,  we  dis-tinguish 
between  ECU  running  resets  or  any  other  ECU 
expected low-power modes that occur at rates that do 
not allow storing in non-volatile memory (flash) the 
most recent sending and receiving coun-ters (needed 
for  authentication)  as  this  would  lead  to  the  flash 
being  non-operational  (e.g.,  due  to  burn-ing).  We 
introduce  two  mechanisms  that  cope  with  these 
scenarios,  which  involve  either  an  ECU  that  heals 
itself or a more drastic system-wide counter re-set (or 
re-synchronization).  We  provide  an  analysis  of  the 
trade-oﬀs and the benefits versus drawbacks of both 
approaches.  We  also  consider  potential  net-work 
faults  that  could  hinder  the  eﬀectiveness  of  our 
security mechanism—we provide a security mecha-
nism  that  is  fault  tolerant.  Finally,  as  we  are  con-
strained by data rates and by costs, we have defined a 
software-only  mechanism  that  does  not  require  ad-
ditional hardware. As security has a cost in terms of 
performance  (because  of  the  additional  bits  needed 
for signatures and counters) and in terms of poten-tial 
hazards that may occur due to poor performance, we 
also work on exploring trade-oﬀs between degree of 
security  and  other  metrics  such  as  resource  uti-
lization. Experimental results show that our security 
mechanism  can  achieve  high  security  level  without 
in-troducing high communication overhead in terms 
of bus load and message latency. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II 
defines  the  system  and  attacker  model;  Section  III 
presents  the  existing  mechanisms,  their  limitations, 
our pro-posed security mechanism, and an evaluation 
of  the  impacts  of  the  security  mechanism  on  the 
system bus load and the message latency; Section IV 
shows  the  experimental  results,  and  Section  V 
concludes this paper. 
 
II.  SYSTEM AND ATTACKER 
MODEL 
We adapt the terminology from [9] to the automo-
tive use case, where a node is one of the computers 
(ECUs) connected to the other ECUs in the vehicle 
via a serial data communication bus to provide the 
following definitions of attack scenarios: 
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existing  data  (e.g.,  a  sender  node  modifies  the 
data  portion  of  a  communication  frame  to  be 
transmitted).  
•  Fabrication:  an  unauthorized  node  generates 
additional data (e.g, a sender node creates a new 
frame with an ID that the node is not au-thorized 
to transmit).  
•  Interception:  an  unauthorized  node  reads  data 
(e.g., a receiver node accepts a message with an 
ID that is not supposed to accept and reads the 
data portion of the frame).  
•  Interruption:  data  becomes  unavailable  (e.g.,  a 
sender node sends high priority frames over the 
communication bus at a very high rate making it 
impossible for other frames to be transmit-ted).  
For the sake of our discussion, we generalize 
modi-cation and fabrication as an unauthorized write 
of data by a node, an interception attack as an unau-
thorized read by a node, and an interruption attack as 
a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. We now define the 
following properties: 
•  Data integrity: data is not changed (written) or 
generated by an unauthorized node.  
•  Con  dentiality:  data  is  not  read  by  an  unau-
thorized node.  
•  Authentication: a receiver or a sender is who it 
claims to be.  
•  Non-repudiation:  a  sender  ensures  that  a  re-
ceiver has received the message, and a receiver is 
sure about the identity of a sender.  
 
For automotive electronics systems and the 
CAN pro-tocol, data integrity and authentication are 
very  rel-evant  properties  which  are  suitable  to  our 
software-only  security  mechanism  solution.  To 
prevent an in-terruption attack, hardware protections 
are required as, because of the very same nature of 
the CAN proto-col (broadcast and multi-master with 
arbitration),  a  malicious  node  can  freely  read  and 
write data from/to the bus.  Interruption attacks are 
outside of the scope of our work. 
Before  introducing  our  attacker  model,  we 
first  state  our  assumptions,  and  provide  definitions 
about our system model as follows: 
 
Assumption 1. The network architecture has only one 
CAN  bus,  and  all  ECUs  are  connected  to  the  bus 
itself. 
 
De nition 1. A node is an ECU. 
 
De  nition  2.  The  sender  of  a  message  is  the  node 
sending the message. 
 
Assumption  2.  A  sender  sends  a  message  by 
broadcasting it on the CAN bus. 
 
De  nition  3.  A  receiver  of  a  message  is  a  node 
receiving the message and accepting it by comparing 
the message ID to the list of its acceptable message 
ID's
2. 
 
Note that CAN is a broadcast protocol, so every node 
―receives‖  the  message,  but  only  receivers  (as  we 
have defined them) accept the message. 
 
Assumption 3. A node can use volatile (RAM) and/or 
non-volatile  (FLASH)  memory  to  store  data.  Data 
stored in RAM is no longer available after a node 
reset; data in FLASH is available after a node resets. 
 
To describe our attacker model, we use a networked 
architecture  topology  as  in  Figure  1.  Although  in 
CAN, any node can play the role of sender and re-
ceiver  in  diﬀerent  bus  transactions,  for  illustration 
purposes, we assume N1 is a sender node and N2 is a 
receiver  node.  We  also  assume  that  N1  and  N2  are 
legitimate nodes. In Figure 1, if malicious software 
takes control of N3, it can access any data stored in 
RAM and FLASH, including data used to implement 
a security mechanism (e.g., shared secret keys). It is 
also possible that an attacker uses a node (N4) that has 
been  added  to  the  network  (e.g.,  to  perform  di-
agnostics on the network this node could be laptop 
running diagnostic software and connected to the net-
work using the CAN adapter interface); in this case, 
the malicious software also has access to the RAM 
and FLASH memory. However, no critical data (e.g., 
shared secret keys) is stored in RAM and FLASH in 
the first place. 
    strong  weak 
sender  receiver  attacker  attacker 
N1  N2  N3  N4 
software  software  software  software 
RAM  RAM  RAM  RAM 
FLASH  FLASH  FLASH  FLASH 
 
Figure 1. Attacker Model. 
 
We are now ready to provide some definitions as fol-
lows: 
De nition 4.  A  strong  attacker  is  an  existing  node 
where malicious software is able to gain control with 
full access to any critical data. 
 
De nition 5. A weak attacker is a node where ma-
licious software is able to gain control but no critical 
data is available (mainly because it was never stored 
in memory). 
 
De  nition  6.  A  legitimate  node  is  a  node  which  is 
neither a strong attacker nor a weak attacker. 
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For example, in Figure 1, N3 and N4 are strong and 
weak attackers, respectively, and N1 and N2 are le-
gitimate nodes. The possible attack scenarios that N3 
and N4 can carry out and that we are addressing with 
our solution are: 
 
Types  Strong Attacker N3  Weak Attacker N4 
Modification    
or  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
Fabrication     
Replay  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
 
 
In the table, we describe the scenario in which a mes-
sage is supposed to be send by a legitimate sender 
(N1). However, N3 and N4 try to alter this situation 
with either a strong or weak attack. Again, we are not 
addressing  attacks  such  as  DoS  as  they  would  re-
quire additional hardware—our proposed solution is 
software-only. We now explain the scenarios as fol-
lows: 
•  Scenario  1:  this  is  possible  if 
important/secret  data  between  N1  and  N2  has  been 
stored  in  RAM  or  FLASH  of  N3.  For  example,  if 
impor-  
tant/secret data is shared and used by every node in 
the network
3, then N3 can use the data stored in RAM 
or  FLASH  and  pretend  to  be  N1  to  send  a  new 
message to N2 (fabrication).  
 
•  Scenario  2:  there  is  no  threat  because  no 
impor-tant/secret data is stored in RAM or FLASH of  
N4.  
 
•  Scenario  3:  this  is  possible  if  N3  reads  a 
message from the CAN bus and then writes the same 
message to the CAN bus without any modifi-cation. 
Note  that,  in  this  case,  N3  does  not  need  to  get 
important/secret  data  between  N1  and  N2,  e.g.,  a 
secret pair-wise key as in Fig-ure 2, because N2 will 
just accept the message thinking it was sent by N1.  
 
• Scenario 4: same as Scenario 3. 
We  now  define  a  masquerade  and  replay 
attack and show how we can prevent it as follows [7]: 
 
De  nition  7.  In  a  masquerade  attack,  an  attacker 
(strong or weak) sends a message in which it claims 
to be a node other than itself. 
 
Note  that  a  masquerade  attack  can  lead  to  a  fabri-
cation attack, a modification attack, or as a special 
case, a replay attack: 
 
De nition 8. A replay attack is enabled by a 
mas-querade  attack,  and  the  node  in  order  to  be 
successful, needs rst to pretend to be another node. In 
the case of CAN, in a replay attack a node transmits 
a copy (replays) of a message it has received from 
the CAN bus. The message is not modi ed or altered. 
It is merely sent to other nodes by a node that is not 
enti-tled to send it. The other nodes have tables that 
match  the  message  id  to  the  sender  and  therefore, 
determine  the  identity  of  the  sender  but  have  no 
provision to au-thenticate it. 
Since CAN is a broadcast protocol, both a 
strong and weak attacker can successfully carry out a 
masquer-ade/replay attack if no security mechanism 
is put in place, or even if pair-wise keys are used as 
the  at-tacker  would  not  need  them  to  successfully 
carry  on  the  attack.  Before  introducing  some  basic 
security mechanisms, we also provide a definition of 
a false acceptance and a false rejection as follows: 
 
De nition 9. A false acceptance is the scenario that a 
node accepts messages which it should reject. 
 
De nition 10. A false rejection is the scenario that a 
node rejects messages which it should accept. 
By the definition, a successful attack implies 
a false acceptance. 
 
III. SECURITY MECHANISMS 
In this section, we will first introduce some 
basic  authentication  mechanisms  and  describe  the 
exist-ing work in this area in more detail. Then, we 
will show the challenges in implementing a security 
mechanism for CAN and how we can overcome these 
diﬃculties  with  our  proposal.  Finally,  we  will  pro-
vide our counter-based implementation, reset mech-
anisms,  and  some  detailed  analysis  of  their  perfor-
mance vs. security levels achieved. We now provide 
a few additional definitions that we will use in the 
rest of the paper. 
Notations  Explanations 
i  the ID of a node 
j  the ID of a node 
k  the ID of a message 
Ni  the node with ID i 
Mk  the message with ID k 
n  the number of nodes 
nk  the number of receivers of Mk 
rk;s  the ID of the s-th receiver of Mk 
f  the function to compute a MAC 
T  the time 
Ki;j  the shared secret key of Ni and Nj 
Ak;s  the MAC for the s-th receiver of Mk 
A  the MAC computed by a receiver 
Ci;k  the counter stored in Ni for Mk 
C
M 
the most significant bits (MSBs) of a 
counter 
CL 
the least significant bits (LSBs) of a 
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1  BASIC AUTHENTICATION  
N1  N2  N3 
K1,2
K1,3 
K1,2
K2,3 
K1,3
K2,3 
 
 
Figure 2. Pair-wise secret key distribution. 
 
Basic authentication is based on sharing a 
secret key between a sender N1 and a receiver N2 and 
computing a Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
[6] which is essentially a signature of a message. A 
key K1;2 is the shared secret key stored in N1 and N2 
and only known by N1 and N2. For the sake of the 
discussion and without loss of generality, we assume 
a pair-wise secret key assignment (an example is 
shown in Fig-ure 2). N1 and N2 perform the following 
steps to send and receive a message Mk: 
 
Sender (N1) 
1 
Ak;1 
= 
f(Mk
; K1;2
) 
2  Send Mk and Ak;1  
 
Receiver (N2) 
1  Receive Mk and Ak;1 
2  A = f(Mk; K1;2)  
3  Accept Mk if and only if A = Ak;1  
 
Note that the ―1‖ of Ak;1 means that N2 is the 
first  and  the  only  receiver  of  Mk.  Even  if  N3  is  a 
strong attacker, since the keys are assigned in a pair-
wise fashion, N3 is not able to compute the MAC (as 
it is missing K1;2) that is needed to attack N2 with a 
message that is supposed to be sent by N1. However, 
since in a broadcast protocol the message transmit-
ted is read by any node in the network, and Mk and 
Ak;1 are sent in the clear, N3 could read this data and 
resend  it  verbatim  (essentially  replay  the  same 
message). N2 is going to accept it as the MAC is a 
match. A possible solution to this problem is to use 
the concept of global time that allows time-stamping 
messages. If global time is adopted then N2 can pre-
vent  the  attack  from  N3.  An  authentication  mecha-
nism with global time-stamping as follows: 
 
 
Receiver (N2) 
1  Receive Mk and Ak;1 
2  Get sending time T 
3  A = f(Mk; T; K1;2)  
4  Accept Mk if and only if A = Ak;1  
 
As  in  the  scenario  explained  earlier,  if  N3 
wants  to  send  Mk  to  N2,  as  it  cannot  retrieve  K1;2 
because  it  does  not  have  it,  it  cannot  compute  the 
correct MAC. In addition, in case of a replay attack, 
if N3 replays the message it will do so using a MAC 
computed us-ing an earlier time stamp that what N2 
would  use  to  compute  the  MAC.  Therefore,  the 
MACs cannot match, and N2 rejects the message. As 
we will show later in this paper, global time is not 
available  in  CAN  and  therefore  we  introduce 
monotonic counters to address replay attacks. 
 
2  EXISTING WORK  
The  basic  authentication  mechanisms  have 
been sum-marized in the above section, but there are 
still  other  alternatives  and  variations  for 
authentication. A lot of existing work focus on digital 
signatures.  How-ever,  digital  signatures  have  very 
high  communica-tion  overhead,  making  them 
inapplicable or at least very diﬃcult to use for CAN. 
In  [6–8],  the  authors  emphasize  the 
constraints in an embedded network and consider a 
time-triggered  (i.e.,  global  time  is  available) 
broadcast protocol. Since every node is a receiver
4, a 
transmitted  mes-sage  includes  MACs  for  all 
receivers. Therefore, N1 and N2 perform the following 
steps to send and re-ceive a message Mk: 
 
The authentication operation using the for-
loop  uses  n  since  the  authors  are  using  a 
comprehensive  def-inition  of  receiver.  This  means 
that  there  are  as  many  receivers  as  nodes  in  the 
network. Each re-ceiver authenticates the message by 
first  identifying  the  correct  MAC  that  the  receiver 
needs to compare to, based upon the information that 
maps each re-ceived message to the unique sender of 
the message itself. Besides the authentication aspect, 
the  au-thors  have  also  introduced  other  interesting 
features  to  their  authentication  mechanism  to  cope 
with the potentially limited communication bus data 
rate and provide fault tolerance. First, only a subset 
of the MAC bits are sent and used for authentication 
pur-poses, i.e., A and Ak;j in the above operations are 
replaced by [A]l and [Ak;j ]l where []l is the trunca-tion 
operation  to  l  bits.  The  authors,  in  their  analysis, 
assume that an unsafe state is reached only when at 
least k out of n most recently received messages are 
successfully attacked. Lastly, in their extension work B.Vijayalakshmi et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                www.ijera.com 
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[8],  the  authentication  is  performed  by  diﬀerent 
voting nodes. 
 
3  CHALLENGES FOR CAN  
Even  with  the  features  proposed  for 
reducing  the  number  of  bits  transmitted  and 
achieving fault toler-ance, two major challenges exist 
in applying the work just described to CAN. First, the 
bandwidth available in CAN is extremely limited. In 
fact, the maximum and nominal data rate of a CAN 
bus is only 500kbps, while each 11-bit ID standard 
frame has a maximum total of 134 bits which include 
a maximum of 64-bit payload, 46 bits of overhead 
(e.g., including CRC bits), and 24 bits for bit-stuﬃng 
[10] in the worst case. If a security mechanism needs 
to add MACs to the original frame, as the original 
frame might have a 64-bit payload, the frame might 
have  to  be  split  in  two  or  more  frames.  This  may 
result in increasing bus utilization which may result 
in a degraded com-munication performance or even 
in a unschedulable system. Finally, as stated earlier, 
there is no global time in CAN (the global time is 
required in [3–8]). 
 
4  OUR SECURITY MECHANISM  
The  key  elements  of  our  proposed  security 
mecha-nism are stored in each node (in the volatile 
and non-volatile memory). The elements are: the ID 
table,  the  pair-wise  symmetric  secret  keys,  and 
message  coun-ters  (receiving  and  sending).  In  the 
following,  we  use  our  definition  of  receivers  (see 
Definition 3). 
•  ID table: unlike the approach described in [6– 8], 
our mechanism does not use MACs for all nodes. 
On the contrary, a sender only computes as many 
MACs  as  the  corresponding  receivers
5  of  the 
transmitted  message.  This  is  done  by 
maintaining a ID table in each node where each 
entry is indexed by a message ID — each entry 
contains the node ID of the sender and the list of 
the node ID’s of the receivers. We define the ID 
table with the following function:  
(i; nk; rk;1; rk;2; : : : ; rk;nk ) = ID-Table(k); 
 
where k is the ID of Mk, i is the ID of the sender of 
Mk, nk is the number of receivers of Mk, and rk;s is the 
ID of the s-th receiver of Mk. A sender can check its 
ID  table  to  deter-mine  how  many  MACs  it  must 
compute, what keys it should use, and what ordering 
of  MACs  it  should  attach  with  the  message.  A 
receiver can check the ID table to determine what key 
it  should  use  and  which  MAC  included  in  the 
received frame it should select. Again, the ad-vantage 
of  relying  on  ID  tables  is  that  our  mech-anism 
reduces  the  number  of  MACs  because  it  considers 
only the receivers that are accept-ing the frame after 
CAN filtering, rather than considering the whole set 
of receivers that the frame is broadcast to. This can 
reduce the com-munication overhead considerably. 
•  Pair-wise  secret  key:  a  pair-wise  key  Ki;j  is 
―shared  secret‖  between  Ni  and  Nj  for  authen-
tication. Every pair of nodes has a shared secret 
key  which  is  not  known  by  any  other  node. 
Therefore,  any  other  node  cannot  mod-ify  or 
fabricate  a  message,  but  a  replay  attack  is 
possible  as  explained  earlier.  Note  that  using 
pair-wise  keys  is  only  a  basic  key  distribution 
method. If we want to further reduce the com-
munication overhead, we could a assign nodes to 
several  groups  where  each  node  in  a  group 
shares a secret key. Of course, there is a trade-
oﬀ between security and performance (minimiz-
ing communication overhead) in  that the  secu-
rity level is diminished but the communication 
performance is improved.  
•  Message-based counter: a counter is used to re-
place the global time and prevent a replay at-
tack.  Each  node  maintains  a  set  of  counters, 
and  each  counter  corresponds  to  a  message, 
i.e., Ci;k is the counter stored in Ni for Mk. If the 
node  is  the  sender  of  Mk,  its  counter  value 
records the number of times that Mk is sent; if 
the node is the receiver of Mk, its counter value 
records  the  number  of  times  Mk  has  been 
received  (and  accepted  after  being  authenti-
cated). Therefore, if a malicious node replays a 
message, a receiver can check the correspond-
ing  receiving  counter  to  see  if  a  message  is 
fresh  or  not.  Because  of  a  network  fault,  a 
receiving counter may not have the same value 
as that of its sending counter. In other words, it 
is possi-ble that a node sends a frame, updates 
its  send-ing  counter,  then  a  network  fault 
occurs, e.g., the electrical bus has a transient 
fault,  and  thus  the  frame  never  reaches  its 
destination.  There-fore,  the  receiving  node 
does not receive the frame and thus does not 
increase its receiving counter. This means that 
two  counters  are  out  of  synchronization. 
However,  our  mechanism  can  deal  with  this 
scenario without any loss of security. We will 
explain this aspect later in the paper. We now 
provide the following additional definitions: 
 
De nition 11. A sending counter for a message is the 
counter stored in its sender. 
 
De nition 12. A receiving counter for a message is the 
counter stored in one of its receiver. 
 
In  our  security  mechanism,  every  node 
maintains its ID table, pair-wise keys, and counters. 
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receive a mes-sage Mk: 
 
Sender (Ni) 
1 (i; nk; rk;1; rk;2; : : : ; rk;nk ) = ID-Table(k) 
2 
Ci;k 
= 
Ci;k 
+ 1 
 
3 
∀s; 
1 
≤ 
s 
≤ 
nk
; Ak;s 
= 
f(Mk
; Ci;k
; Ki;rk;s 
) 
4 Send Mk; Ci;k; Ak;1; Ak;2; : : : ; Ak;nk  
 
Receiver (Nj ) 
1  Receive Mk; Ci;k; Ak;1; Ak;2; : : : ; Ak;nk  
2  (i; nk; rk;1; rk;2; : : : ; rk;nk ) = ID-Table(k)  
3 
Continue if and only if find s; 1 ≤ s ≤ nk; j = 
rk;s 
4  Continue if and only if Ci;k > Cj;k 
5  A = f(Mk; Ci;k; Ki;j )  
6  Accept Mk and Cj;k = Ci;k if and only if A = Ak;s  
 
Based  on  this  mechanism,  our  security 
mechanism  can  protect  any  masquerade  attack  and 
replay  at-tack.  We  prove  our  claim  using  the 
following three scenarios: 
•  If an attacker sends a message which is not sup-
posed  to  be  received  by  the  receiver,  then  the 
receiver  will  reject  the  message  in  Line  6  by 
checking its ID table.  
•  If an attacker sends a message which is not sup-
posed to be sent by the attacker, and it is a replay 
attack, then the receiver will reject the message 
in Line 2 by checking the counters.  
•  If an attacker sends a message which is not sup-
posed to be sent by the attacker, and it is not a 
replay  attack,  then  the  receiver  will  reject  the 
message in Line 12 by comparing the MACs.  
 
5  COUNTER IMPLEMENTATION  
These operations can meet the requirements 
stated  by  our  problem  formulation.  However,  the 
number of bits used for the counter must be explored. 
If the number of bits is not suﬃcient during the life-
time of a vehicle, then the counter may overflow. For 
example, if the counter stored at the receiving side 
overflows and resets to zero, then the replay attack 
may succeed as the attacker just needs to wait for this 
event  to  happen,  and  therefore  resend  a  counter 
which is larger than the reset counter stored in the 
receiver; if the number of bits used for the counter is 
too large, then the bus will be overloaded. Therefore, 
we propose a solution where the counter C is divided 
into two parts: the most significant bits (MSBs) C
M 
and the least significant bits (LSBs) C
L—only C
L is 
transmitted with the message. The steps performed 
 
by Ni and Nj are similar, but only Ci;k
L is transmit-ted: 
 
For more details, the reader should see Figure 3. If 
Ci;k
L > Cj;k
L, then this is the same scenario as that of 
the  original  mechanism;  if  Ci;k
L  ≤  Cj;k
L,  then  the 
receiver will use Cj;k
M + 1 to compute the MAC. If 
there is a replay attack, then the receiver will test Cj;k
L 
= C 
L to be true and use Cj;k
M + 1 to compute the 
MAC which will be diﬀerent from the one transmitted 
in  the  replayed  message.  The  receiver  will  fail  the 
test  comparing  the  stored  computed  MAC  and  the 
received MAC and will reject the message. 
 
The  advantage  of  using  this  mechanism  is 
that  we  can  reduce  the  communication  overhead 
without any loss of security. Of course, if the receiver 
consecu-tively  misses  several  messages  due  to  a 
network fault, it may reject a message although there 
is no attack in place, as its receiving counter may not 
be up-to-date (out of synchronization). However, the 
proba-bility that a counter is out of synchronization is 
very low. If a counter is divided into C
M and C
L and 
the probability of a network fault is q, the probability 
that a counter is out of synchronization is q
2jCLj . For 
example, if |C 
L| = 3 and q = 0:1, the probabil-ity that 
a counter is out of synchronization is only 0:1
8. Even 
if this scenario occurs and the computed MAC would 
not match although it would pass the counter test, the 
receiver  will  continue  rejecting  mes-sages  (false 
rejection).  Although  this  scenario  is  not  optimal,  a 
counter out of synchronization is a better option than 
a  successful  attack.  In  addition,  we  ad-dress  this B.Vijayalakshmi et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                www.ijera.com 
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potential  issue  by  providing  counter  reset 
mechanisms. This is the focus of the next section in 
the paper. 
 
Figure 3. The steps performed by a receiver Nj of a 
message Mk sent by a s 
 
6  COUNTER RESET MECHANISMS  
A  counter  reset  mechanism  is  required  to 
deal  with  an  ECU  hardware  reset  or  with  counters 
that are out of synchronization because of a network 
fault. There are two types of hardware resets. First, 
either an ECU may reset as expected, e.g., as it goes 
into  a  low  power  mode  as  a  result  of  a  specific 
driving mode in which some ECUs are shut oﬀ to 
reduce the energy usage, or the ECU experiences an 
unexpected hardware re-set  due to a power failure. 
Regardless of the reason why an ECU resets, the rate 
at  which  the  resets  occur  or  the  minimum  time 
interval between them might be too short to allowing 
storing  critical  data  into  FLASH  which  could  be 
restored at a later time, as storing data in the FLASH 
too  frequently  (at  a  rate  that  is  higher  than  of  the 
expected  maximum  rate  of  resets)  may  lead  to 
burning  the  FLASH  itself.  Therefore,  we  have 
devised mechanisms that deal with scenar-ios where 
critical data such as updated counter values cannot be 
stored  in  FLASH  at  a  rate  that  makes  them 
suﬃciently up-to-date (or close to) to avoid excessive 
false  rejections  on  the  receiver  side  when  they  are 
later restored into RAM. When data can be copied to 
FLASH the mechanism is simple. Before an expected 
shutdown, or change of power state, the ECU copies 
and stores the relevant data in FLASH from RAM. At 
wake-up, the ECU restores the data from FLASH into 
RAM.  However,  unexpected  shutdowns  can  oc-cur 
when a hardware failure occurs, or there is a lack of 
power, etc. In this case, it is not safe to assume that 
critical data was stored in FLASH and that can be 
restored.  Therefore,  provisions  have  to  be  put  in 
place to bring back the ECU, and therefore the sys-
tem, to a secure state (e.g., with counter values that 
prevent attacks). Our mechanisms that deal with un-
expected hardware resets include ―node self-healing‖ 
and ―network-wide‖ counter resets. The mechanisms 
provide trade-oﬀs between security levels and com-
munication overhead. In the following, we describe 
the self-healing mechanism operations performed by 
a node that has experienced a hardware reset. 
1.  The node sets a FLAG variable to zero.  
2.  The node stores its counters into FLASH every P 
seconds. The time interval P is a function of the 
FLASH technology.  
3.  If a node is experiencing an expected hardware 
reset,  then  the  node  tries  to  store  the  latest 
counters  value  from  RAM  to  FLASH  before 
shutting down. If the operation is successful (it 
may not be if the FLASH controller refuses to 
allow  it  because  of  potential  burning),  then 
FLAG should be set to 1. If not, the remain-ing 
steps are the same of those taken in case of an 
unexpected  hardware  reset  due  to  a  power 
failure.  
4.  If  a  node  reset  unexpectedly,  nothing  can  be 
guaranteed  including  storing  data  to  FLASH, 
therefore the FLAG stays at zero.  
5.  When  a  node  wakes  up,  if  FLAG  =  1,  it 
restores  all  counters  from  FLASH  and  set 
FLAG = 0; if FLAG = 0, it restores all counters 
from FLASH (last counters saved) and increase 
them by Q, and stores them into FLASH. 
 
P is a parameter that depends upon the FLASH tech-
nology. There is a trade-oﬀ between data freshness 
and expected life of the FLASH memory.  Q is the 
upper bound of the number of messages that could be 
sent  within  the  time  interval  P  to  prevent  a  replay 
attack—diﬀerent counters can be associated with dif-
ferent values of Q for diﬀerent messages. 
Since the value of Q is an estimate provided 
by the designer of the number of messages instances 
received during P , it is possible that this value is not 
the  real  upper  bound  or  worst  case  number  of 
message in-stances sent during P . Hence, a larger Q 
value than the real one may lead to false rejections, 
meaning to a situation where a receiving node has a 
receiv-ing  counter  that  is  higher  than  the  counter 
being  re-ceived  although  it  should  not  be.  In  this 
case,  the  receiving  node  may  reject  message 
instances even if it should not until the sender counter 
reaches  the  receiver  stored  counter  value. 
Conversely, if Q is smaller than what it should be, 
then  the  receiver  will  accept  message  instances  it 
should  not  (false  accep-tances).  In  both  cases,  the 
designer is expected to tune the value of Q oﬀ-line. 
The advantage of this mechanism is that at wake-up 
following a node re-set, a node resets its counters by 
itself without the need of additional messages to reset 
the  counters  of  other  nodes.  Therefore,  the B.Vijayalakshmi et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                www.ijera.com 
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communication  overhead  is  minimized  as  no 
network-wide counter synchroniza-tion is necessary. 
However, as the parameter Q is an estimate, potential 
false rejections or, even worse, false acceptances may 
occur. 
Besides  the  self-healing  reset  mechanism,  we  also 
pro-pose a network-wide reset mechanism. The key 
con-cepts are: 
•  A  RESET  message  to  set  all  counters  of  all 
nodes to 0.  
•  A  REQUEST  message  to achieve  fault toler-
ance.  
•  New session keys to prevent replay attacks.  
 
In this mechanism, because every counter is reset to 
0, new session keys are required; otherwise, an at-
tacker could successfully replay-attack. Therefore, a 
random generated number needs to be included in a 
RESET message, as it is used to generate the new 
session key for each node. We can further divide this 
into two possible approaches. The first one is a ―dy-
namic‖ network reset where any node experiencing a 
reset can generate a random number and send a 
RESET message to all other nodes. The second ap-
proach is a ―static‖ network reset where only one spe-
cial master node can generate a random number and 
send a RESET message to all other nodes. 
 
 
Figure 4. The finite state machine of a node in the 
dynamic network reset. 
 
 
The  finite  state  machine  of  a  node  in  the  dynamic 
network reset is shown in Figure 4. This approach 
has the following features: 
 
 
•  Every node needs to maintain a variable FLAG 
to indicate if it is the last node generating the 
random  number  X  and  sending  the  RESET 
message.  
 
•  If a node experiences a reset (goes to the re-set 
state),  then  it  will  set  all  counters  to  0,  set 
FLAG to 1, generate a random number X and 
its new session keys, and send a RESET mes-
sage with X.  
 
 
•  If a node receives a RESET message, then it 
will set all counters to 0, set FLAG to 1, and 
generate its session keys.  
 
•  If  a  node  finds  itself  out  of  synchronization 
(missing  a  RESET  message  due  to  network 
fault), then it will send a REQ message to ask 
for going back to synchronization.  
 
If a node receives a REQ message, then it will 
check  if  FLAG  is  1.  If  yes,  it  is  the  last  node 
generating X and sending the RESET message, so it 
will  resend  a  RESET  message. 
 
Figure 5. The finite state machine of a master node 
in the static network reset. 
 
 
Figure 6. The finite state machine of a non-master 
node in the static network reset. 
 
The finite state machine of a master node in 
the  static  network  reset  is  shown  in  Figure  5;  the 
finite state machine of a non-master node in the static 
network reset is shown in Figure 6. The diﬀerences 
between static and dynamic resets are as follows: 
•  A node does not need to maintain a variable 
FLAG because only the master node can gener-
ate a random number and send a RESET mes-
sage.  
•  A REQ0 message is used by a non-master node 
to ask the master node to reset the network.  
•  If a non-master node experiences a reset, then 
it  will send a REQ0  message and  wait  for a 
RE-SET message.  
•  If a master node receives a REQ0 message, it 
will  set  all  counters  to  0,  generate  a  random 
number X and its session keys, and send a RE-
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Although the network-wide reset mechanism 
can  guarantee  that  there  is  no  false  rejection  or 
success-ful  replay  attack,  it  may  determine  high 
transient bus peak loads due to the increasing traﬃc 
created by the messages used to reset the counters in 
every node. 
To  this  point,  we  have  proposed  a  self-
healing  and  a  network-wide  (static  or  dynamic 
master) reset mech-anism. Both mechanisms provide 
advantages  and  dis-advantages  in  terms  of  security 
level and bus utiliza-tion. In a real case, maybe a mix 
of  them  could  be  applied,  depending  on  the 
requirements  on  the  com-munication  resource,  its 
available capacity in terms of its data rates, and the 
secure criticality level of each message. 
 
7  ANALYSIS  
We show how the security mechanism has 
an  impact  on  the  system  bus  load  and  message 
latencies by for-mulating the problem as a feasibility 
analysis  prob-lem.  The  system  model  includes  the 
following param-eters: 
•  n: the number of messages.  
•  q: the probability that a message is missing due 
to a network fault.  
•  R: the bus data rate.  
 
The following message Mk parameters are defined: 
•  nk: the number of the message receivers.  
•  Rk: the message rate (frequency, as the inverse 
of its period).  
•  Sk: the message original size.  
•  Lk:  the  upper-bound  of  the  total  length  of 
MACs and LSB of the counter.  
•  Ck: the lower-bound of the length of LSB of the 
counter.  
•  Pk: the upper-bound of the probability of a suc-
cessful attack.  
•  Qk: the  upper-bound of the probability that a 
counter is out of synchronization.  
 
If Mk is not a security-critical message, then Ck = 0 
and Pk = Qk = 1. 
 
We define the following decision variables: 
•  xk: the length of the MAC for Mk.  
•  yk: the length of the LSB of the counter for Mk.  
 
We define several constraints for Mk as follows: 
•  The  length  of  LSB  of  the  counter  should  be 
larger than or equal to Ck.  
•  The probability of a successful attack should be 
smaller than or equal to Pk.  
•  The probability that a node is out of synchro-
nization should be smaller than or equal to Qk.  
 
The constraints in mathematical forms are defined as 
follows: 
xk + yk  ≤  Lk; 
 
yk  ≥  Ck; 
 
2 
x
k 
≤ 
P  ; 
 
q
2 
y 
k 
k   
 
  ≤  Qk: 
 
 
The last two constraints also define the 
probability of a false acceptance (a node accepts 
messages which it should reject) and a false rejection 
(a node rejects messages which it should accept). We 
can easily de-rive the minimal values of xk and yk and 
then com-pute the message latency using the equation 
[11]: 
 
lk = B + 
∑ (
⌈ lkRi⌉  
Si 
+ 
ni
xi 
+ 
yi 
)
; R 
i2hp(k) 
where lk is the latency of Mk, B = maxi 
Si+nixi+yi , 
R 
 
and hp(k) is the index set of messages with higher 
priorities  than  Mk.  By  using  a  traditional  fix-point 
calculation, the latency is computed through an iter-
ative method until convergence (if a solution exists). 
 
 
IV.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section,  we show  how our  security 
mechanism  impacts  on  the  system  bus  load  and 
message  latency.  Since  there  is  no  global  time  in 
CAN, the approaches in [3–8] are not applicable to 
CAN networks. We used a test case with 17 security-
critical messages among 138 messages, and q = 0:1, 
R = 500 (kbps), Lk = 32 (bits), Ck = 1 (bit) for all 
security-critical messages. Table 1 and Table 2 show 
the  relative  bus  load  and  av-erage  latency  with 
diﬀerent values of P and Q, where Pk = P and Qk = Q 
for all k, under the assump-tions that the nk is 1 or 3. 
The number of receivers was not known at the time 
of  our  experiments,  so  we  have  used  a  simple 
assumption.  If  this  information  is  provided,  more 
general  experiments  can  be  done  by  assigning 
diﬀerent values for Pk and Qk for dif-ferent k. Again, 
the main purpose of this paper is to provide a security 
mechanism and show how the 
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Table 1: The relative bus load and average message latency under nk = 1 and diﬀerent values of P and Q where 
―—‖ means that there is no feasible solution. Without the security mechanism, the original bus load 376.44kbps 
and average message latency 11.535ms are both scaled to 1. 
 
            Q         
                     
P  10 
1  10 
4  10 
7  10 10  10 13 
  Load  Avg L.  Load  Avg L.  Load    Avg L.  Load  Avg L.  Load  Avg L. 
                       
                     
10 
1  1.0244  1.0506  1.0263  1.0571  1.0282   1.0591  1.0300  1.0625  1.0300  1.0795 
10 
2  1.0413  1.0832  1.0432  1.0883  1.0451   1.0968  1.0469  1.0987  1.0469  1.1164 
10 
3  1.0582  1.1213  1.0601  1.1232  —    —  —  —  —  — 
10 
4  —  —  —  —  —    —  —  —  —  — 
Table 2: The relative bus load and average message latency under nk = 3 and diﬀerent values of P and Q where 
―—‖ means that there is no feasible solution. Without the security mechanism, the original bus load 376.44kbps 
and average message latency 11.535ms are both scaled to 1. 
 
on the bus load, the average message latency, or the 
message  latency  (deadline)  for  each  message,  then 
we  can  check  if  the  security  mechanism  can  be 
applied or not. As shown in Table 1, when nk = 1, if 
we  want  to  make  sure  that  the  probability  of  a 
success-ful attack and the probability that a node is 
out of synchronization are both bound by 10 
4, then 
there is a 3% increase on the bus load and a 6.25% 
increase on the average message latency. Note that, 
in some cases where the values of P and Q are both 
large,  there  is  no  feasible  solution.  For  our 
experiments,  we  show  that  we  can  achieve  a  very 
high security level (e.g., P (successful attack) ≤ 10 
8), 
with  a  bus  load  or  average  message  latency 
increasing  less  than  6%  and  14%,  respectively. 
However, as shown in Table 2, when nk = 3, we can 
see  that  the  feasible  region  is  reduced.  This  is 
because it needs 3 MACs, but there are only at most 
Lk − Ck bits available. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
We described a security mechanism that can 
be  used  to  retro-fit  the  CAN  protocol  to  protect  it 
from  cyber-attacks  such  as  masquerade  and  replay 
attacks. The mechanism is suitable for this protocol 
because  it  has  a  low  communication  overhead  and 
does not need to maintain global time. Besides, the 
solution  is  software-only,  hence,  it  is  not  overly 
expensive  to  implement.  Experimental  results 
showed that our security mechanism can achieve high 
security  level  without  introducing  high 
communication  overhead  in  terms  of  bus  load  and 
message latency. 
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            Q         
                     
P  10 1  10 4  10 7  10 10  10 13 
  Load  Avg L.  Load  Avg L.  Load    Avg L.  Load  Avg L.  Load  Avg L. 
                       
                     
10 1  1.0094  1.0241  1.0113  1.0267  1.0131   1.0288  1.0150  1.0322  1.0150  1.0488 
10 
2  1.0150  1.0322  1.0169  1.0394  1.0188   1.0425  1.0206  1.0445  1.0206  1.0612 
10 
3  1.0206  1.0445  1.0225  1.0481  1.0244   1.0506  1.0263  1.0571  1.0263  1.0741 
10 
4  1.0282  1.0591  1.0300  1.0625  1.0319   1.0646  1.0338  1.0668  1.0338  1.0839 
10 
5  1.0338  1.0668  1.0357  1.0733  1.0375   1.0767  1.0394  1.0789  1.0394  1.0962 
10 
6  1.0394  1.0789  1.0413  1.0832  1.0432   1.0883  1.0451  1.0968  1.0451  1.1144 
10 
7  1.0469  1.0987  1.0488  1.1007  1.0507   1.1040  1.0526  1.1061  1.0526  1.1238 
10 
8  1.0526  1.1061  1.0544  1.1129  1.0563   1.1181  1.0582  1.1213  1.0582  1.1393 
10 
9  1.0582  1.1213  1.0601  1.1232  —    —  —  —  —  — 
10 10  —  —  —  —  —    —  —  —  —  — B.Vijayalakshmi et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                www.ijera.com 
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